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This was the scariest day of the entire crisis, when the modern, highly sophisticated money market suffered what was in effect a catastrophic old-fashioned bank run. The trigger was the apparently technical news that the Reserve Primary Fund, a money market mutual fund, had had to take a loss thanks to its holdings of Lehman bonds. But as investors had treated the fund as though a loss was impossible, this triggered panic. Reporting on it, our problem was to explain how grave the situation was, but avoid being alarmist and create a self-fulfilling prophecy. As the day wore on and money kept pouring into the safety of Treasury bills and out of almost everything else, it grew difficult to keep count of the historic records that were falling. Our main story reported that investors were so scared that they had pushed T-bill yields to their lowest since Pearl Harbor.